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Notes on the Future of the Legal Profession 
in the United States: The Key Roles of 
Corporate Law Firms and Urban Law Schools 
BRYANT G. GARTH† 
INTRODUCTION 
Anxiety over the future of the U.S. legal profession comes 
in large part from the fear that law school enrollment will 
not return to the levels of the prosperous years before the 
“bubble” burst in 2010. The first year class, beginning in 
2009, totaled 51,646, the largest ever.1 The current class, 
beginning in 2016, is 37,107, which goes back to the 1973 
level.2 Commentators and scholars adduce a number of 
reasons why the “new normal” will be reduced law school 
attendance, which is tied to a decline in the attractiveness 
and prestige of the legal profession.3 Whether the doomsday 
scenarios are correct or not, the numbers are disappointing 
and consequential to law schools largely dependent on 
 
† Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine; Affiliated 
Research Professor, American Bar Foundation. 
 1. Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Enrollment and Degrees 
Awarded 1963–2012 Academic Years, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_a
nd_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckda
m.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
 2. Id.; Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, 2016 Standard 509 
Information Report Data Overview, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_a
nd_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2016_standard_509_data_overview.authch
eckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
 3. E.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, What Happened to the Class of 2010? 
Empirical Evidence of Structural Change in the Legal Profession, 2015 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1043. 
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tuition. Low numbers have led to lay-offs, early retirements, 
and frozen salaries in many cases. Law schools able to do so 
have also redoubled efforts to find new sources of revenue—
especially through increased foreign LL.M. enrollments—
and there are also unresolved issues about how to absorb the 
increased numbers of LL.M. students. There is no doubt that 
the short-term adjustments have been painful, and they have 
been exacerbated by efforts to keep entering credentials as 
high as possible for U.S. News rankings purposes. 
The question about the future numbers of law students 
is important, but more fundamental is the question of 
whether there is a major shift in the attractiveness of legal 
education or simply a relative decline, which may be short 
term, in the number of applicants and enrollees to law school. 
We do not have solid research yet to understand why the 
profession appears to be less attractive today than in the 
recent and perhaps longer term past. The Association of 
American Law Schools (AALS) has begun a research project, 
entitled “Before the J.D.,” which aims to explore the reasons 
for what the AALS sees as a long-term decline in law school 
applications going back to the period after World War II.4 
The project focuses on the attitudes and choices that 
undergraduates make in deciding their career direction.5 The 
Law School Admission Council (LSAC) has also focused 
attention on this situation with a research report on the 
attitudes of undergraduates to law school.6 
The reaction of the ABA Section on Legal Education is 
particularly notable. Reversing an antitrust-inspired policy 
not to restrict entry into the legal profession by limiting law 
 
 4. Barbara Elenbaas, Jeff Allum: Before the JD, ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS., 
https://www.aals.org/about/publications/newsletters/aals-news-fall-2016/jeff-
allum-before-the-jd/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
 5. Id. 
 6. ANN GALLAGHER & PHIL HANDWERK, BEHIND THE DATA: COMPARING LAW 
SCHOOL APPLICANTS TO OTHER COLLEGE FRESHMEN (2012), http://www.lsac.org/
flipbooks/behindthedata/#/1/. 
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school accreditation, the new approach of the Section on 
Legal Education takes a much tougher stance on schools 
with low bar passage stemming from low entry credentials.7 
They must restrict attrition to lower than twenty percent on 
the one hand, and on the other hand, seventy-five percent of 
the graduates must pass the bar within two years of 
graduation.8 “Consumer choice” and a market-based 
approach to law school regulation may no longer be the 
mantra. The assumption of the ABA Section on Legal 
Education appears to be that students with relatively weak 
credentials are making bad choices to attend law school, and 
the solution is to penalize law schools that admit them.9 As 
evidenced by the most recent bar results in California, 
discussed below, the consequences may be quite severe if the 
rule goes into effect. 
Yet loan defaults are still rare and most students, as 
reported in the data from the After the JD Project and the 
more recent NALP Foundation data, are, in retrospect, 
satisfied with their decision to attend law school.10 The 
prevailing narrative is very pessimistic about the future of 
law schools, but the data is far from clear.11 This Symposium 
organized by the University at Buffalo School of Law focuses 
 
 7. Memorandum from the Hon. Rebecca White Berch & Barry A. Currier to 




 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Rebecca Sandefur, Bryant G. Garth & Joyce Sterling, Financing Legal 
Education—The View Twelve Years out of Law School, in AFTER THE JD III: THIRD 
RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 79 (2014); Ronit Dinovitzer, 
Bryant G. Garth & Joyce S. Sterling, Buyers’ Remorse? An Empirical Assessment 
of the Desirability of a Lawyer Career, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211 (2013). The NAPL 
Foundation data comes from surveys submitted by law schools which the 
Foundation then aggregates. 
 11. Michael Simcovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law 
Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 280 n.41 (2014). 
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on the future of law school in light of this uncertain context. 
There is no way to divine the future of the legal 
profession or law schools, but I hope to use this opportunity 
to clarify some of the issues of the debate. I do not pretend to 
know whether law school applications will ever return to the 
levels of the period prior to 2010, whether the market for 
legal services at the individual or corporate level is shrinking 
or growing over time, and how that relates to law school 
applications. Nor do I have prescriptions to offer to attract 
people to law school. I do hope to clarify the debate through 
a historical and sociological perspective that is missing from 
most of the analyses. 
In particular, I want to focus on the question of the 
relative attractiveness of legal careers to two basic groups 
that are separable but also overlap. The first is the group of 
individuals who choose to attend law school as a classic step 
in upward mobility. The second is those with very strong 
educational credentials who attend law school as a ticket into 
a career of high status and prospects for high pay. In contrast 
to the upward mobility project, we can call this the elite 
reproduction project. The upward mobility project is loosely 
connected with the role of urban law schools not high in the 
law school rankings. The elite reproduction project links to 
the large corporate law firms. 
The history of the U.S. legal profession has blended 
together elites and strivers for upward mobility, but the 
combination has not always been free of tension.12 Today, the 
issue is whether law is seen as playing either of these roles, 
and, if not, whether it will again in the future. My thesis is 
that if law is still central to the elite reproduction role and 
the upward mobility role, the position of law and lawyers in 
the United States will remain strong. There may be ebbs and 
flows in applications to law school and fluctuations in the 
 
 12. See generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 
2005). 
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demand for legal services, but there is no long-term crisis. 
The corporate law firm is the key to the elite 
reproduction role because of its historical position at the top 
of the legal profession and its close connection to economic 
and political power. The urban law school is the key to the 
upward mobility project because of its traditional position 
not only in providing access but also in situating graduates 
in the political and social ecology of our major cities. Neither 
institution is free from challenge, and there are challenges 
today. The challenges tend to come in a particular way. First, 
the elite position of the bar faces attack. Then the relatively 
elite schools and their supporters turn the attack on the 
lower status schools. Both sides need each other, but the 
relationship is not always peaceful. 
This Article will separate each of these legal career 
strategies and institutional contexts and root them in the 
historical structure of the legal field and the fields of 
economic and state power. I use the term strategies 
consistent with Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological approach.13 
This approach looks not at whether rational actors choose to 
go to law school, but rather whether ambitious individuals 
seeking upward mobility or affirming elite status see law 
school as the natural choice (or at least one of them) for 
themselves and their circle of friends and acquaintances. The 
question is whether the choice of law school appears to be 
reasonable and possible for individuals from the perspective 
of their social world. It appears reasonable and possible not 
because of an ad hoc calculation of costs and benefits, but 
because a large number of individuals have internalized a 
view of the world in which lawyers occupy influential 
positions, garner respect, and prosper economically. The 
view comes from many sources, including the media, the 
legal profession, and such factors as seeing how their parents 
 
 13. These terms are explained in PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WACQUANT, 
AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 9–11 (1992). 
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and social world respond to individuals identified as lawyers. 
The view has a long history in the United States, but it is not 
inevitable. 
Within the structural sociology inspired by Bourdieu, the 
field refers to a semi-autonomous space in which individuals 
compete for the rewards generated by the field. From that 
perspective, the question is whether the strategy of going to 
law school makes sense if one seeks to become a player in 
fields of economic or political power. The attractiveness of the 
law degree depends on individuals believing that the 
investment in law will continue to be rewarded in status or 
material rewards in those fields. The embeddedness of law 
graduates in economic and political power is a key part of 
that attraction. That embeddedness is part of a long history 
producing a legal field with particular characteristics that 
both endure and evolve. The corporate law firm late in the 
nineteenth century became the organization central to elite 
lawyer careers—the so-called “lawyer-statesperson” 
operating at the intersection of professional leadership, 
economic power, and state power.14 The institution of the 
corporate law firm is closely connected to elite law schools. 
The institution key to the upward mobility project is the 
urban law school accessible originally to those who were not 
welcome in the elite schools or the corporate law firms.15 The 
urban law school is a product of the boom in law schools late 
in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century—
despite the hostility of the institutions of the organized bar.16 
Each of the career paths and the institutions associated 
with them have gains and losses in attractiveness in 
particular historical periods. This Article will discuss each 
 
 14. Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Law, Lawyers, and Empire, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER 
(1920–  ) 718, 722–723 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). 
 15. Joyce Sterling, Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant Garth, The Changing Social 
Role of Urban Law Schools, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 389, 389–422 (2007). 
 16. Id. at 390, 397. 
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path and institution in historical perspective, showing how 
the law schools and the legal profession have weathered 
challenges in the past. The historical challenges to the 
corporate law firms within the fields of economic and state 
power are therefore quite instructive. As noted above, there 
is also a historical relationship between the criticisms of the 
corporate law firms and the mobility project. The threat to 
the hierarchy at the top unleashes attacks on access at the 
lower levels of the hierarchy. The relative elites seek to 
enhance the prestige of the legal profession’s “upper” ranks 
by purging the “lower” ranks. 
As noted at the outset, the stakes involved with law 
school enrollment are at one level simply the prosperity of 
law schools. The larger debate is the position of lawyers in 
the United States, which also relates to the strength of law. 
It is easy to see why leaders of the profession today believe 
that the decline in the attractiveness of the legal career 
threatens the “rule of law.” There is also a more sociological 
way to describe the stakes. Success in responding to the 
current challenges involves a process of retooling and 
absorbing challenges—in other words, containing social 
change, whether progressive or reactionary—from outside 
the law and absorbing them into the fabric of the law. 
Absorbing into the fabric of law is also the reproduction with 
moderate change of both the institutions and hierarchies of 
the field. 
This Article will proceed in four parts after this 
introduction. Part I will discuss the major concerns that 
characterize the current nervousness about the future of the 
legal profession. Part II will focus on the elite reproduction 
story and the challenges to corporate law firms over time. 
Part III will then focus on the urban law schools, their 
historical role, and the challenges they have faced 
historically and in the present. Finally, the Conclusion will 
again return to what the stakes are for the current challenge. 
It will highlight the importance of this competing but 
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symbiotic combination of corporate law firms tied to elite law 
schools and the upward mobility graduates of the urban law 
schools—a relative few of which will gain positions in 
corporate law firms. 
I. A LITANY OF CONCERNS: THE CURRENT CRISIS 
The concerns can be divided into issues about the 
expense of law school, the relative decline of corporate law 
jobs, and the relative attractiveness of positions competing 
with lawyers at the high end of corporate law and involving 
careers serving individuals. 
With respect to law as an upward mobility career, there 
are multiple questions about the value of the law degree with 
respect to its cost. Some suggest that only those who get 
scholarships or can afford to pay should attend law schools.17 
A similar contention is those who accumulate debt at the not 
unusual $100,000–150,000 level should attend law school 
only if they are confident they will obtain employment at a 
corporate law firm, which is a way also to suggest that 
prospective lawyers should avoid the lower status law 
schools.18 The cost of law school, from this perspective, has 
simply gotten too high for the vast majority of students—
those who will not be able to obtain admission to the elite law 
schools that can promise corporate law jobs to more than five 
to ten percent of their graduates.19 The new focus on bar 
passage reinforces this message. The argument is that those 
whose test-taking skills are relatively weak as evidenced by 
low LSAT scores should not be admitted to law schools in 
states where the bar exam is designed to make their entry 
extremely difficult, such as California. 
A related concern is that the number of corporate law 
positions for new graduates is seen to be shrinking. NALP 
 
 17. E.g., PAUL CAMPOS, DON’T GO TO LAW SCHOOL (UNLESS) 45, 96, 97 (2012). 
 18. E.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 157–58 (2012). 
 19. See id. at 140. 
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statistics show that that the number of new positions has not 
returned to the level obtained prior to the 2009 crash.20 
There are also a number of individuals who suggest that the 
economic returns to small and solo practice are shrinking in 
relation to other careers.21 Further, non-traditional 
providers of legal services—through unbundling, 
outsourcing, artificial intelligence, e-discovery programs, 
and similar technological innovations—threaten the growth 
of the demand for legal services by lawyers.22 It is 
understandable that potential applicants hoping to move 
into professional positions as a way to improve their 
economic and social position are shying away from law 
school. 
There are related concerns about the path of law as elite 
reproduction for the so-called best and brightest. If, as 
mentioned above, the corporate partner is the embodiment 
of the elite of the legal profession, the attractiveness and 
prosperity of that position—now including in-house lawyers 
as “lawyer-statespersons”23—matters. Articles questioning 
the future of “Big Law” and the attractiveness of that 
position deter Ivy League and comparable graduates from 
law school. The concern that the decline in law school 
applicants has come disproportionately from the more elite 
undergraduates reflects this dynamic.24 From August 2013, 
 
 20. “[F]or the Class of 2015 there were still more than 1,800 fewer entry-level 
jobs in large law firms than there were for the Class of 2008.” James G. Leipold 
& Judith N. Collins, The Stories Behind the Numbers: Jobs for New Grads Over 
More Than Two Decades, NALP BULL., (Dec. 2016), http://www.nalp.org/
1216research. 
 21. E.g., BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH 
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 4, 47 (2015). 
 22. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR 
FUTURE (2013). 
 23. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The General Counsel as Lawyer-Statesman: A 
Blue Paper, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM ON THE LEGAL PROF. 5, 13 (2010), 
https://clp.law.harvard.edu/assets/General_Counsel_as_Lawyer-Statesman.pdf. 
 24. Catherine Rampell, Law School Applications Decline, Especially from 
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“Across the board, the number of people applying to 
matriculate in fall 2012 was 67,700, down about 17 percent 
from the number who applied to matriculate in fall 2008 
(82,000). The average decline in applicants who graduated 
from the ‘elite’ schools was 28 percent.”25 
If we posit that many of the individuals fitting this group 
aspire to both wealth and an opportunity to become leaders 
in political or economic fields, the rise of positions competing 
with law relates to this concern. A very recent New Yorker 
article, for example, focuses on the “revolving door” between 
investment banks and leadership positions in the federal 
government.26 The revolving door has long been identified 
with lawyers and has been a source of the attractiveness of 
elite law.27 To the extent that investment bankers fill that 
role, the position of elite law may be endangered. Whatever 
the reasons for the attraction, there are numerous articles in 
the popular press suggesting that a high percentage of elite 
graduates go into investment banking or business 
consulting.28 
An article in the Washington Monthly, in 2014, noted, for 
example, “so many Harvard and Stanford students . . . both 
accept and abhor that being recruited by Wall Street or 
certain consulting firms has become a measure of how smart 
and talented they are.”29 A similar article quotes students 
 
Graduates of Elite Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), 
https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/law-school-applicants-decline-
especially-among-grads-of-elite-colleges/?_r=0. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Alec MacGillis. The Democrats’ Fight over Finance, NEW YORKER (Nov. 14, 
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/14/the-democrats-fight-
over-finance. 
 27. See id. 
 28. E.g., Aimee Groth, Here’s Where Ivy League Students Go When They 
Graduate, BUS. INSIDER (June 29, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-
where-ivy-league-students-go-when-they-graduate-presentation-2012-6#-3. 
 29. Amy J. Binder, Why Are Harvard Grads Still Flocking to Wall 
Street?,WASH. MONTHLY, Sept.–Oct. 2014, at 53, 56. 
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saying, “Everyone treated finance as this elite profession 
that smart people did after they graduated, especially people 
who aren’t on another more structured path like medical 
school or law. . . . It seemed like anybody who’s just 
generically intelligent, skilled in the social sciences . . . the 
best of the best would go to Wall Street.”30 An article on Yale 
College graduates from the class of 2014 shows the 
prominence of business consulting and investment 
banking.31 A fascinating anthropological study of Princeton 
undergraduates and investment banks suggests that the 
debate at Princeton today over investment banking is what 
it might have been for law a generation ago.32 The question 
is whether one should become an investment banker as the 
default career choice for the ambitious Ivy League 
undergraduate.33 
The concerns today are quite strong, therefore, ranging 
from the demand for lawyers, the income in relation to 
indebtedness, and the relative attractiveness of other elite 
careers. The particular manifestations of the crisis are 
somewhat different than in the past, but threats to the 
position of lawyers are not new. The profession is resilient; 
indeed, it is so resilient that we tend to ignore or downplay 
earlier threats. The legal field tends to absorb threats in 
ways that allow it to reproduce prevailing hierarchies and 
the key institutions. We see this especially in the challenges 
to the elite status of corporate lawyers closely tied to 
economic power and elite law schools. 
 
 30. Amanda Terkel, America’s “Brain Drain”: Best and Brightest College 
Grads Head for Wall Street, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/15/brain-drain-college-grads-wall-
street_n_1069424.html (internal quotations omitted). 
 31. Tyler Foggatt, 2014 Career Paths Revealed, YALE DAILY NEWS (2014), 
http://technology.yaledailynews.com/features/2014-careers/. 
 32. See KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET, 43–44 
(2009). 
 33. See id. 
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II. THE CORPORATE LAW FIRM’S HISTORICAL ROLE AND ITS 
CHALLENGERS 
The corporate law firm late in the nineteenth and early 
in the twentieth century came to embody the elite of the legal 
profession.34 The firms were, at first, highly criticized as the 
hired guns of such robber barons as Andrew Carnegie, J.P. 
Morgan, and John D. Rockefeller. But leading lawyers such 
as Elihu Root, Philander Knox, John W. Davis, Henry 
Stimson, and others overcame much of this criticism by 
taking on the position of “lawyer-statesperson.” They 
identified themselves with public service, supporting local 
reforms, and moving back and forth into presidential 
administrations; and even helped to write the rules—notably 
antitrust—that regulated and, not incidentally, legitimated 
their giant corporate clients. That participation in writing 
the rules ensured that the new rules built a demand for their 
services that stimulated the need for more corporate lawyers 
like themselves. They were also leaders in developing the 
philanthropic activities of their clients, exemplified by the 
Carnegie Foundation’s investment in international law and 
the Peace Palace in The Hague, and by Elihu Root’s Nobel 
Peace Prize for work on international arbitration.35 
This model started on Wall Street but spread to the 
emerging cities of the U.S. continent. Law firm biographies 
of, for example, O’Melvany and Myers in Los Angeles,36 and 
Baker and Botts in Dallas,37 enumerate the number of 
 
 34. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 14, at 722–24. 
 35. Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Constructing a Transatlantic 
Marketplace of Disputes on the Symbolic Foundations of International Justice, in 
CONTRACTUAL KNOWLEDGE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL EXPERIMENTATION IN 
GLOBAL MARKETS 185, 189, 191–93 (Gregoire Mallard & Jerome Sgard eds., 
2016). 
 36. See generally 1 WILLIAM WEBB CLARY, HISTORY OF THE LAW FIRM OF 
O’MELVENY & MYERS, 1885–1965 (1966). 
 37. KENNETH J. LIPARTITO & JOSEPH PRATT, BAKER & BOTTS IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN HOUSTON 6 (2011). 
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lawyers from those firms who became mayors and in other 
ways pillars of their local communities while also staying 
close to local and national economic power. 
The appeal of the position of “lawyer-statesperson” is 
evident. It combined public service, high status, good pay if 
not extraordinary wealth, and connections to wealth and 
power more generally. And it meant that the key individuals 
creating the rules for governance were those who could profit 
from the demand for their services that the new rules 
created. This place at the intersection of private and public 
power allowed corporate lawyers, and those connected to 
them, to play a particularly strong and appealing social role. 
The importance of lawyers builds the importance of law as 
well. Of course, relatively few corporate lawyers became 
prominent “lawyer-statespersons,” but successful corporate 
lawyers were drawn to and rewarded for their community 
activities. The prominent “lawyer-statespersons” enhanced 
the reputation and attractiveness of the legal profession 
generally. 
Within the sociology of organizations and professions, 
there is a thriving literature about this role. Neoinstitutional 
sociologists talk of professions as institution builders and 
recently have noted the particular role of professional service 
firms—law firms, paradigmatically—as keys to 
organizational innovation and adaptation both domestically 
and globally.38 
This historical appeal of law and legal education can be 
seen in various sources. As Auerbach noted in his history of 
the divided legal profession, the law review editors of 
Harvard, Yale, and Columbia as early as the 1920s 
overwhelmingly “entered private corporate practice upon 
graduation from law school.”39 Historical accounts of 
 
 38. See, e.g., W. Richard Scott, Lords of the Dance: Professionals as 
Institutional Agents, 29 ORG. STUD. 219, 223–27 (2008). 
 39. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
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government leaders support this pattern. Growing up in the 
late 1930s, for example, many of those who became the 
leaders in the 1960s and 1970s were inspired by the careers 
of Root and Stimson in particular. They were attracted to and 
connected to law and corporate law firms even if not all 
formally becoming lawyers. 
Geoffrey Kabaservice’s book, The Guardians,40 helps 
make this point. It describes the careers of Cyrus Vance, 
Kingman Brewster, Elliot Richardson, John Lindsay, 
McGeorge Bundy, and Paul Moore.41 They were the leaders 
of what Kabaservice terms the liberal establishment.42 
Vance, Brewster, Richardson, and Lindsay came from 
prominent families and went to law school as a kind of 
natural career to assert influence and get involved in social 
reform.43 They supported each other and dominated major 
institutions—Yale College, the Ford Foundation, and politics 
including Mayor of New York City.44 The institution that 
they would return to between positions was the corporate 
law firm, where they could rebuild their wealth and their 
staple of private and public connections. 
We can hypothesize on the basis of this research that 
there was a very strong attraction of the ambitious, talented, 
and well-connected into the elite legal world revolving 
around corporate law firms, politics, and public service. The 
environment on the Ivy League campuses, most likely, 
resembled what is so well documented for Princeton today, 
except that the default career for the smart and ambitious 
 
MODERN AMERICA 143 (1976). 
 40. GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, THE GUARDIANS: KINGMAN BREWSTER, HIS 
CIRCLE, AND THE RISE OF THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT (2004). 
 41. Id. passim. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 14–43. 
 44. Id. 
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was then corporate law rather than investment banking.45 
The attraction of law graduates into these corporate law 
firms was key to the continued status of lawyers, to the role 
of law in providing the language of solutions to social 
problems, and to building new demand out of those solutions. 
Some highly suggestive interviews about the early 
careers of leading public interest lawyers support the 
persistence of this perspective into the 1960s. Charles 
Halpern, interviewed by Thomas Hilbink as part of a 
doctoral dissertation on public interest law, reported being 
relatively apolitical as an undergraduate at Harvard.46 He 
then attended Yale Law School and went to work at Arnold 
and Porter after a federal clerkship.47 He reported that “[h]e 
imagined a career of working at a law firm, doing pro bono 
work, and taking stints in government.”48 His ambitions 
reveal that he had perfectly internalized the hierarchies and 
incentives that put U.S. corporate lawyers at the top of the 
legal field and brought economic rewards, respect, and 
influence over public policy. It was not a cost benefit analysis 
but rather following a well-worn path that seemed natural to 
those on a path to attaining or reproducing elite status. 
Another key individual profiled by Hilbink, Carlyle Hall Jr., 
graduated from Harvard Law School and, in 1969, went to 
work for O’Melveny and Myers in Los Angeles.49 He was 
attracted to O’Melvany, he said, by Warren Christopher, the 
most important partner and one “who had long combined 
private lawyering with public service.”50 Hall too was 
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following the internalized program of the elite lawyer. 
This internalized elite track is not inevitable even if 
pretty well-established in the United States. The common 
sense of elite undergraduates can change in relation to many 
contingencies. Put in sociological terms, the strong position 
of corporate lawyers in the field of political and economic 
power can be challenged. Other career trajectories can 
become more attractive—at least in the short term. One era 
of challenge was the Depression and the New Deal. The 
courts and Wall Street lawyers were staunch opponents of 
the New Deal, in part because of the efforts of the New Deal 
to contain business and strengthen the regulatory state.51 
There were populist attacks on the Wall Street 
establishment.52 The strength of this attack, if sustained, 
might have deterred elite undergraduates from corporate 
law—seen as the problem, not the potential source of 
solutions. 
The story of the response to this challenge cannot be 
detailed here. It is told well by Ronen Shamir.53 Legal 
Realism and the efforts of law professors at Harvard, Yale, 
and Columbia, in particular, to support the New Deal warded 
off the challenge and absorbed it.54 Rather than weakening 
the influence of corporate law firms because of their 
opposition to increased state power and ties to oligarchic 
economic power, new corporate law firms close to the 
regulatory state rejuvenated the corporate law position.55 
The New Deal ended up producing more work for corporate 
lawyers, and the new institution of the Washington, D.C. law 
firm made a new generation excited about the prospects of 
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practicing corporate law—in firms like Arnold, Fortas and 
Porter, which the Realists created. 
Two aspects of this story are important. One is 
rebuilding and securing the position of elite corporate 
lawyers in and around the government—as natural public 
servants in leadership positions. This phenomenon is a key 
to attracting elite students into the law schools and then to 
corporate law. The other aspect is the demand for corporate 
legal services. From the positions in government, elite 
lawyers were able to ensure that lawyers participated fully 
and thrived from the New Deal and the activist state that 
continued after the 1930s, which then allowed the profession 
to grow to serve the new demand.56 The process occurred 
naturally. Lawyers within the New Deal used their tools and 
influence to promote solutions to social problems that, of 
course, privileged law and the courts.57 In contrast, although 
it cannot be developed here, governmental leaders in France 
and Great Britain in the same period built their welfare 
states to diminish the influence of the legal profession and 
the courts.58 The ties of the legal profession to the corporate 
and propertied holders of wealth led reformers to find 
solutions that did not give a privileged role to lawyers and 
courts.59 There was no set of entrepreneurial academics and 
lawyers to retool law and lawyers for the more activist 
state.60 
There were very similar challenges in the 1960s, which 
Hilbink’s dissertation captures in the portrayal of the careers 
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of Halpern, Hall, and others.61 These individuals, as noted, 
were looking to become elite “lawyer-statespersons” in the 
mold of their mentors.62 In the era of the late 1960s, however, 
corporate law began to lose its appeal. It is telling that 
Halpern began to feel increasingly attracted to activism and 
disillusioned with his work for Arnold and Porter.63 In the 
politicized world of the 1960s, the career for which he had 
prepared himself had depreciated in value through the 
attacks on law that served the status quo or, at best, very 
slow change.64 The career lost some of its appeal for the so-
called best and brightest. Again, however, 
entrepreneurialism within the profession led to a retooling 
that adjusted to the new political and social setting. 
These lawyers absorbed the activism around them and 
developed a new elite solution. Working with others who 
shared his position, Halpern came up with a proposal for 
Ford Foundation funding of a Center for Law and Social 
Policy.65 The same story occurred with Hall, who also became 
disillusioned with corporate practice, again reflecting the 
depreciation of the social status of that traditional path to 
the elite.66 He joined with three others from O’Melveny and 
Myers to work on a proposal to the Ford Foundation for a 
Center for Law in the Public Interest.67 Both Halpern and 
Hall’s group got funding for liberal public interest law firms 
by the Ford Foundation—led by McGeorge Bundy, who 
moved there from the White House.68 Bundy and the Ford 
Foundation responded in part to these proposals because of 
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their internalized commitment to the maintenance of the 
elite role of lawyers moderating social change while serving 
the state and business interests.69 They created liberal public 
interest law firms, but they were not fundamentally opposed 
to the power of corporate law firms.70 They ensured a close 
connection between corporate lawyers and public interest 
law firms by providing that board members must be 
respectable corporate lawyers.71 
Civil rights and employment discrimination law, 
environmental law, and other new areas of regulation then 
attracted ambitious and well-connected lawyers into elite 
law, now expanded to include the leading public interest 
organizations as well as corporate law firms.72 From the 
point of view of the project of encouraging Ivy League and 
comparable graduates to attend law school, it did not matter 
whether they went to public interest law or corporate law—
even though for individuals it could represent an agonizing 
personal choice. The point was the public interest law helped 
to retool corporate law, keep the attractiveness of law school 
for elite reproduction, and make it possible also for demand 
creation fueling law firm prosperity—with the obvious 
example of environmental law. 
There are two more challenges that merit examination 
and lead to the place where we are today. The first was the 
challenge that is now represented in the dominance of 
investment banking in the imagination of undergraduates in 
the Ivy League. This phenomenon is also the challenge of the 
M.B.A. to the J.D. The M.B.A. gained prestige more or less 
equal to law in the 1980s, partly because of the deregulation 
and intensified business competition that began around that 
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time.73 The second challenge is related to the changes in the 
economy. It was the challenge of the political right—inspired 
especially by neo-liberal economists—to the close 
relationship of corporate law firms to the regulatory state 
and relatively progressive law. 
An interview that Yves Dezalay and I conducted in 2000 
is indicative of the first challenge. We interviewed an 
individual who was then a partner of Goldman Sachs.74 He 
was a graduate from a leading law school and business 
school. He had three summer jobs: McKinsey, Goldman 
Sachs, and Cravath.75 He described the choice he ultimately 
made between Goldman Sachs and Cravath as follows: 
I found the work at Goldman . . . more challenging and stimulating and 
more commercial and more rewarding, and I seemed to get more 
responsibility quicker than I perceived to get at Cravath. . . . And I liked 
the financial side as much as the legal side, because it seemed that the 
financial side was driving things. And I would say that I was struck at 
my summer at Cravath, working on a project with [another investment 
bank]. . . , and how I thought the guys at Cravath were much smarter 
than the guys at [the bank], but the guys at [the bank] were really calling 
the shots. And that was an eye opener for me, because I really had no 
exposure to investment banking growing up. In fact, I was very skeptical 
when I got to business school, and met all the investment banking 
analysts who were talking about how they were changing the world and 
running deals.76 
This individual’s father was a corporate lawyer and perfectly 
understood the choice.77 His mother worried that he was 
going into a trade rather than a profession.78 
This interview could be used to posit a shift in the career 
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movement of those who earlier would simply have gone to the 
corporate law firm, but the interview has another dimension 
as well. The interviewee went on to note: 
[O]ne thing which, you know, the U.S. [corporate law] firms basically 
understand: that we’re staffed with very inexperienced people, who are 
bright, but inexperienced. You know, if I hire, let’s say . . . [a lawyer at 
a top U.S. firm], he’s probably the lawyer I’ve worked with the most over 
the years, and who’s really, a, I think maybe the best lawyer I’ve ever 
worked with. If I hire [him] on a project, and I’m not involved, I know 
that [he] is there. And if one of my guys does something that they 
shouldn’t, or is in over his head, I’m going to hear.79 
The tight links between the investment banks and the law 
firms allow for a division of labor in which the very junior 
investment bankers can draw on the expertise and 
experience of lawyers who know how to monitor the role the 
investment bankers are supposed to play. They conspire to 
“get the deal done” in the collective interests of an elite close 
to economic power.80 
There is another way that the rise of investment banks 
and also business consultants complement the corporate law 
firms. As demonstrated elsewhere, the model of the corporate 
law firm inspired the other elite professional service firms.81 
It is not a coincidence that investment bankers now go in and 
out of government. Both competitors borrowed the 
partnership model, the commitment to public service, and 
the practice of hiring young talent primarily from the most 
elite of the undergraduate institutions and business 
schools—and also law schools. For a number of reasons, 
therefore, the challenge from these organizational 
competitors is not a zero-sum game for law firms. It is a 
division of labor as well. The rise of McKinsey and other 
business consultants in the 1980s went with a persistent 
downsizing of corporations that generated considerable work 
for corporate law firms, and the wave of mergers and 
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acquisitions generated new legalized technologies of 
business warfare such as the poison pill.82 
The rise of these particular competitors, therefore, is not 
inconsistent with maintaining the prominence of corporate 
law firms and the demand for their services even though the 
talent is shared by the elite organizations. The division of 
labor means that the lawyers especially have a place as they 
get older and accumulate expertise and judgment—
strengthening their opportunities also as corporate 
statespersons.83 The mimicry of the corporate law firm model 
akin to the creation of the Washington law firm in the 1930s 
competes with and refurbishes the role of the corporate law 
firm generally in the fields of economic and political power. 
This pattern of challenge and absorption can be found 
again with the recent challenge of the political right, which 
is well-documented in the works of Ann Southworth, Stephen 
Teles, and Amanda Hollis-Bruskey.84 Teles has a section of 
an article entitled “Grassroots Without Elites: The 
Conservative Legal Movement Circa 1980,” which is 
especially germane to this story.85 As in the 1930s and in the 
1960s, an ascending political movement—this time on the 
right—found itself quite isolated from a legal establishment 
that was invested in serving prevailing power structures.86 
There was an attack on the role of elite law, the liberal 
political role of many in corporate law firms, and the way 
that liberals used courts as one part of their toolkit to 
promote liberal social policies. The grassroots of the right did 
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not at first see a role for elite law in their movement. Not 
surprisingly, the initial policies of the Reagan 
administration were aimed at curtailing legal aid, public 
interest law, and the role of the courts. But the situation 
changed again through the entrepreneurialism of a new 
generation. 
The activities of the Federalist Society, the 
entrepreneurialism of Edwin Meese and others, and the rise 
of conservative foundations supporting allied public interest 
law firms gain was transformative within the enduring 
model. The result was the rise of elite conservative public 
interest law and conservative activists as corporate lawyers 
in the second Reagan administration.87 After that 
administration, there were many more conservative elite 
lawyers available to move into the elite legal academy and 
the conservative public interest law firms, there were 
respectable scholarly theories for lawyers on the right, and 
there were openings for conservative pro bono attorneys in 
large law firms. It was easy to find conservatives who were, 
as Southworth quotes one of them, “the next generation of 
Lloyd Cutlers and Joe Califanos who are prepared to run law 
firms and to assume major government positions.”88 The mix 
of conservative partners in law firms and conservative public 
interest law firms created a role for elite corporate lawyers 
that helped to maintain their position in the legal field and 
in the field of state power. 
Corporate law firms (now also corporate counsel) are 
currently well positioned in the state and economy even 
though there is a right and left establishment now—a 
divided elite. There is another dimension to this comeback as 
well. The Reagan era conservatives, as noted, wanted to get 
the courts out of the way from the executive and legislative 
branches. Legal doctrine was seen correctly as a reflection of 
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the close relationship between corporate lawyers and the 
regulatory state. Active courts were considered part of the 
problem rather than a solution. Now the situation is 
changed—once more reaffirming the position of elite 
corporate law. 
An anecdote reveals the changed situation. At an event 
on the Supreme Court hosted at University of California, 
Irvine School of Law in the summer of 2015, one of the 
commentators responded to a question about whether the 
Supreme Court was getting too liberal or too conservative 
with activist jurisprudence. He stated that he asked his 
conservative friends if they would trade Citizens United89 for 
the case striking down the Defense of Marriage Act,90 and 
that he asked his liberal friends the option the other way. It 
seems, he noted, that both sides were content today with the 
active role of the Supreme Court. And indeed, nearly every 
major issue today comes before the Supreme Court—gay 
marriage, Obamacare, elections, campaign finance, and 
many more. This state of affairs is perfect for elite corporate 
law firms. 
An article on the Supreme Court Bar published by 
Reuters examined who handled these major cases and found 
that it was a very small group of specialists mainly situated 
in large corporate law firms.91 “They are the elite of the elite: 
Although they account for far less than 1 percent of lawyers 
who filed appeals to the Supreme Court, these attorneys 
were involved in 43 percent of the cases the high court chose 
to decide from 2004 through 2012.”92 They provided 
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a decided advantage for corporate America, and a growing insularity at 
the court. Some legal experts contend that the reliance on a small cluster 
of specialists, most working on behalf of businesses, has turned the 
Supreme Court into an echo chamber—a place where an elite group of 
jurists embraces an elite group of lawyers who reinforce narrow views of 
how the law should be construed.93 
Of course, the number of lawyers handling these cases is 
small as a portion of the corporate bar. But they make the 
case for the importance of the institution of the notable 
corporate lawyer, exemplified by the conservative-liberal 
alliance of Ted Olson and David Boies—both corporate 
lawyers—in the case against the Defense of Marriage Act.94 
And note that there is a place in this world also for the elite 
public interest lawyer and elite law professor advocate, even 
though the numbers of Supreme Court advocates are much 
fewer than are found in the corporate bar. The Supreme 
Court itself is also protected by both sides of the divided elite 
from nominations of lawyers such as Harriet Myers, 
condemned in large part for a non-elite pedigree. 
From this perspective, the particular role of the 
corporate legal elite in the U.S. state and economy is again 
very strong. The pattern of elite lawyers brokering social 
change by using the courts and serving at the intersection of 
the state, the economy, and the academy is still with us. One 
would expect that the social prominence of this role will 
continue to attract a good portion of the best connected and 
best performing undergraduates into the law. The structural 
position of the corporate lawyer is still intact. As noted, that 
role is in part challenged by investment bankers and 
business consultants, but competition from those positions 
also reinforces the elite role of corporate law and potentially 
keeps corporate lawyers in a strong position to profit from 
any innovations in corporate behavior produced by the 
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consultants or bankers. 
The strong structural position of corporate law firms, 
and therefore elite law, does not necessarily mean increasing 
demand for legal services or increasing law school 
enrollments. Without the structural position, there would be 
a major crisis for the role of law and lawyers. But the demand 
for lawyer services—which fuels lawyer compensation and 
feeds back into the number of applications to law school—
depends on much more than this structural position. As 
many have pointed out in recent years, technological 
innovation and the competition that commoditizes many 
services put constant pressure on the corporate law firms 
(and other service providers). Without new demand-creating 
innovations in the corporate market, we can expect demand 
to contract over time. But, historically, there have always 
been innovations—such as big businesses suing other big 
businesses in the 1980s95—that brought increased demand. 
Such innovations have historically fueled the creation of 
demand that might otherwise have been unexpected. It is not 
surprising that in the Depression, and again as recently as 
1990, conventional wisdom predicted a permanent relative 
decline in the demand for legal services that did not 
materialize.96 There may be a permanent decline, but a 
projection of current trends oversimplifies the process of 
demand creation. 
There is no doubt a crisis in the sense of a decline in the 
past several years in law school enrollments, and the decline 
in the enrollments of those from the most elite 
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undergraduate institutions is an important part of the crisis 
story.97 But if we look at the structural position of the 
corporate law firm—and big law generally—the situation 
looks much less troubling. Certainly there are other aspects 
to this story, but the position of the corporate law firm is one 
key dimension that so far remains strong 
I also do not want to make a normative argument, but I 
want to note there are two aspects of this “success” story of 
corporate law for more than a century in attracting top talent 
and finding ways to re-adapt to maintain its strong position. 
One is that the strong role of law is maintained in part 
because of the social importance of leading lawyers, 
including especially lawyer-statespersons of the corporate 
law firms. Neither the New Deal, the rise of the left, nor the 
rise of the right—despite initial challenges—pushed aside 
the role of corporate lawyers and their connections to 
corporate and philanthropic power, elite law schools, elite 
positions in the judiciary, and key positions in state power. 
This success of law, however, is also success in containing the 
power of social movements by linking them to an evolving 
establishment that reproduces itself through the process of 
containment. At the end of the day, corporate lawyers and 
their clients survive potential threats to their position as 
social change movements are moderated and absorbed 
through elite reproduction. Elite law does not lead social 
change. It adapts to it and contains it. 
III. ACCESS TO UPWARD MOBILITY, THE URBAN LAW SCHOOLS, 
AND THE CHALLENGE FROM RELATIVELY ELITE LAW 
The story of law as an upward mobility career is related 
to the story of the demand for legal services in the United 
States. In countries where access to a legal career is limited, 
and especially where career paths are relatively rigid, there 
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is less innovation in fueling new demands for legal services.98 
The entrepreneurial ability of the U.S. law firm, as Lawrence 
Friedman has noted, stems in part from the relative 
openness of the legal profession.99 Of course, that openness 
is relative. Minorities and women did not traditionally have 
access to legal careers, and corporate law firms were long the 
preserve of WASP elites. 
The history is again important. Prior to the development 
of corporate law firms, the legal profession in the United 
States was already relatively open in terms of at least social 
class. Individuals did not even need a degree to become a 
lawyer. The law school only gradually became the chief 
means for gaining access to a legal career, and as law schools 
increased in importance, a growing number of urban law 
schools began to provide access to immigrants and others 
that the existing university law schools did not serve. Robert 
Stevens observed that the number of law students and law 
schools went from 1200 students and 21 schools in 1870 to 
4500 students and 61 schools in 1890 to 22,000 students and 
140 law schools in 1916.100 The YMCA was one of the chief 
sources for the new law schools established over this period, 
establishing some nineteen schools by 1927.101 The 
combination of night classes and low tuition made these 
schools quite attractive to the children of immigrants in the 
major cities. From 1920 to 1940, largely because of these 
groups, the lawyer population increased by fifty percent to 
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181,000.102 
The increase was not without its critics, whose rhetoric 
is still quite familiar sounding. According to Jerold 
Auerbach, “[f]or years the tradition of virtually free access to 
the bar had troubled lawyers who watched uneasily while 
immigration and urbanization transformed the nation and 
their profession.”103 Complaints included overcrowding in 
the profession and the poor ethics of the immigrant 
lawyers.104 Auerbach noted further that “notions of the 
profession as an accessible democratizing institution which 
fostered social mobility became suspect once the origins of its 
newest members changed.”105 The bar’s reaction was to try 
to raise academic standards including mandating college 
attendance. The attack on the immigrants, he noted, also 
deflected attention from the role of the bar in resisting social 
reform.106 Criticism of the corporate law firms and the legal 
elite could be refocused on reforming the so-called lower 
ranks. 
Professors of the university law schools—in part working 
through the AALS—allied with the ABA leadership against 
the urban law schools: “perhaps the strongest attraction of 
an alliance was the boost it would give their own efforts to 
beat back the night law schools, whose enrollments 
continued to climb.”107 The Reed Report by the Carnegie 
Foundation, which came out in 1920, was part of this process 
of pushing back against the night law schools.108 Reed 
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recognized the access role of the night law schools, but he 
criticized them especially as “cheapened copies” of the 
university law schools, and he proposed that the profession 
simply be divided into two kinds of lawyer.109 There would be 
probate, trial, and criminal work for those who went to the 
night schools, and business practice for those who went to 
the university schools—differentiation by the “economic 
status of the client.”110 In 1921, two pillars of the corporate 
legal elite, Elihu Root and William Howard Taft, used the 
Reed Report to try to raise standards sufficiently to stop the 
entrance of “incompetent practitioners” into the 
profession.111 The requirement of at least two years of college 
was the main vehicle they used to try to restrict admission 
and diminish the enrollments of the urban law schools.112 
The Depression of the 1930s accelerated the attack on 
the urban and night law schools.113 The economic crisis of the 
bar prompted calls to close down the night law schools on the 
basis of their low quality, the poor ethics of those seeking 
upward mobility through law, and an oversupply of 
lawyers.114 The method again was to try to upgrade the 
credentials required to attend law school and also to upgrade 
the requirements for law school accreditation.115 The night 
and urban law schools had enough support in the legal 
profession and the government generally to resist the attack. 
Indeed, the ranks of the profession continued to grow at a 
fairly steady pace, although it slowed after 1960 (until 
picking up again in the 1970s with the expansion of 
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opportunities to minorities and especially women).116 
The “two-hemisphere” thesis of Heinz and Laumann, 
based on a study of Chicago lawyers, captures the division of 
the legal profession in the 1970s.117 Their book Chicago 
Lawyers highlights the higher status of the corporate law 
firms characterized by lawyers who attended elite schools, 
were largely WASP males, and represented only corporations 
rather than individuals.118 They note the lower earnings, 
prestige, and credentials of those who serve individuals.119 
Their focus on the status differential is understandable, but 
it tends to downplay the achievement of the urban law 
schools in building up their own hemisphere.120 The urban 
law schools, exemplified in Chicago by Loyola, DePaul, John 
Marshall, and Chicago-Kent, were already deeply embedded 
in urban government—at that time, the Daley Machine.121 
They occupied key positions as state—not federal—
prosecutors, public defenders, judges, and municipal 
lawyers.122 They were also litigators.123 They made a virtue 
out of necessity and built strong self-help networks outside 
of the corporate bar.124 
The combination of judges, litigation, and democratic 
politics in Chicago, for one notable example, accounts in 
large part for the rise of the personal injury bar there (with 
parallel developments elsewhere). For example, bright 
graduates of Loyola in the 1950s would find a place in the 
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government or in small firms, since the corporate firms were 
not open to them.125 Some of them did the work necessary to 
overturn—through judicial and governmental assistance—
the limitations on what juries could award and what one 
needed to prove to win damages for personal injury. The 
biography of Philip Corboy, who was listed as one of the key 
“notables” in the network of the Chicago bar, illustrates 
exactly how the urban lawyers evolved over time.126 While 
never achieving the status of the elite corporate lawyer, the 
elite of the personal injury bar—still mainly educated in the 
urban law schools—earn huge amounts of money and play a 
major role in politics at all levels.127 
Other research shows how the urban law schools, in 
particular the Catholic ones such as DePaul and Loyola, 
gained a foothold in the corporate law firms and gradually 
expanded the opportunities for the network of graduates 
from those schools in the corporate law firms.128 The 
networks helped recruit and promote success in those firms 
for those without the elite credentials traditionally 
required.129 Ted Seto of Loyola in Los Angeles has 
documented more recently the surprising number of Loyola 
and Southwestern graduates in the partnership ranks of the 
Los Angeles corporate law firms.130 As discussed below, 
many of them did not begin their careers in those law firms. 
The After the JD (AJD) cohort that began practice in 
2000 showed this phenomenon of a relative openness among 
large law firms to graduates with top grades from the urban 
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law schools and, indeed, the non-elite law schools more 
generally.131 The potential urban law school advantage was 
the availability of critical masses within local corporate law 
firms of graduates from local law schools, which could 
increase the pressure on hiring committees to interview and 
hire graduates from their schools.132 The AJD project showed 
also that there was much greater recruitment from the elite 
and relatively elite law schools, but the process at the time 
was at least relatively open.133 
The Great Recession of 2009 brought a renewed effort to 
attack the upward mobility project of law schools by 
attacking the category of neither night law schools, nor 
urban law schools, but rather the more general category of 
lower-ranked law schools.134 One strain of the critique is, as 
noted above, that the divide proposed by the Reed report 
should be formalized akin to some of the divisions one finds 
in Europe. In this case, the upward mobility project would 
primarily be represented by individuals who would attend 
two-year law schools, pay lower tuition, and be taught by 
faculty with little or no research agendas.135 They would 
again do the probate, family law, criminal law, and civil 
practice contemplated by the Reed Report.136 They would not 
represent large corporations and certainly would not gain 
access to corporate law firms. The two hemispheres of the 
1960s would be strengthened, and yet, it is not clear if the 
two-year graduates would even continue to get the positions 
in local government as prosecutors or public defenders. 
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Unlike in the 1930s, the culprit now is not the ethics of 
the bar, but rather the costs of law school, the debt loads of 
those who attend law school and lack access to the corporate 
bar, and, more recently, the LSAT scores of applicants to 
lower-ranked law schools. As noted elsewhere, the most elite 
law schools today, in contrast to the 1920s and 1930s, are not 
active participants in this debate.137 Law schools above the 
lower tiers, but not at the elite level, have led the charge, 
including: faculty from Washington University, St. Louis; 
Indiana University, Bloomington; University of Tennessee, 
and Vanderbilt.138 They have been joined by the American 
Bar Association. 
The ABA Section on Legal Education appears to have re-
embraced the role from the 1930s against the urban law 
schools and lower-ranked schools more generally. The idea is 
that there are too many lawyers, particularly from lower-
ranked schools.139 Antitrust law as interpreted by the Justice 
Department in the 1980s prevents closing law schools in 
order to restrict competition, but the Section is promoting a 
crude tool which, in terms of predicted outcome, is designed 
to accomplish that exact agenda.140 The proposal has two 
aspects. One is to require that seventy-five percent of the 
graduates of a law school pass the bar within two years.141 
The other is to presumptively limit law school attrition that 
occurs other than through transfer to twenty percent.142 The 
 
 137. See Garth, supra note 96, at 515. 
 138. See BARTON, supra note 21, at 153–54; CAMPOS, supra note 17, at 67–78; 
Garth, supra note 96, at 515. 
 139. There is also within the ABA a Task Force on the Future of the Legal 
Profession and a Task Force on the Costs of Legal Education. See Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Task Force on the Financing of Legal Education, at 59 (June 17, 2015), 
www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/committees/about-task-force-on-
the-financing-of-legal-education.html. 
 140. Memorandum from Rebecca White Berch & Barry A. Currier, supra note 
7. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
GARTH 65.2  
2017]  CORPORATE FIRMS AND URBAN SCHOOLS 321 
proposed reform has gained widespread support among 
deans of leading law schools, and the legal press has even 
criticized it as not going far enough.143 Deans of lower-ranked 
schools with high minority enrollments have understandably 
been critical, citing the potential impact on diversity. The 
rhetoric of the proponents from higher ranked schools is 
instructive. 
An article in the ABA Journal quotes Deborah Merritt of 
Ohio State Law School: 
While diversity is an important goal, minority law students deserve to 
attend law schools that will position them for successful legal careers, 
Merritt wrote in her letter supporting the change. “Maintaining the 
accreditation of law schools with poor bar passage rates, on the contrary, 
is a counterproductive way to diversify the profession,” Merritt wrote. 
“We owe minority students the best our education system has to offer—
not programs with low success rates.”144 
Daniel Rodriguez and Craig Boise, Deans of 
Northwestern and Syracuse, have defended the new proposal 
as follows in the National Law Journal: 
In this difficult economic climate for law graduates, the challenge for law 
schools is twofold. First, schools must commit to creative strategies to 
bring in able students who will thrive in law school, pass the bar, and 
move on to meaningful and successful careers. This is at least as 
important with regard to students of color as everyone else in the 
student community. 
Second, they must develop mechanisms of student support and academic 
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assistance to measurably increase the bar passage rates of students. 
That most law schools have been able to do precisely that over the long 
run indicates that a high bar-exam passage standard can be met. A law 
school that cannot or will not meet this criterion should not be permitted 
to continue to operate with the imprimatur of ABA accreditation. 
The consequence of maintaining the status quo on this issue is 
distressing: students with a demonstrably small likelihood of success 
will continue to pay tuition to unscrupulous law schools. The ABA 
Section of Legal Education should be commended, not criticized, for its 
efforts to require greater accountability from the law schools it 
accredits.145 
The quotations focus on the issue of what the proposed 
bar passage standard will do for diversity, but the issue is 
more general. From the position of higher ranked schools, the 
question is about bringing in students with appropriately 
high credentials and also creating programs to pass the bar 
exam. Schools with low bar passage, high debt, and relatively 
low employment ten months after graduation are termed 
“unscrupulous.”146 While not said explicitly, the suggestion 
is that they are undermining the prestige of law schools and 
the legal profession generally. The proposed deflected 
solution to the crisis—again as in the 1930s—is to purge a 
portion of the lower-ranked law schools.147 
The California law schools are especially at risk because 
of the relatively low cut score used in California. A bar exam 
score that fails in California may very well succeed in 
Illinois, Minnesota, or other states with different cut rates. 
The most recent bar results from the July 2016 examination 
make this concern more than academic.148 Only five of the 
twenty-one ABA accredited law schools in California beat the 
seventy-five percent, although ten of the schools below that 
figure will certainly get seventy-five percent within two 
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years; but seven schools were below fifty percent, and they 
will be challenged by the new standards if they go into 
effect.149 The challenge the lower-ranked schools face is even 
greater. They are told that they need programs to improve 
bar passage. In the words of Rodriguez and Boise, “they must 
develop mechanisms of student support and academic 
assistance to measurably increase the bar passage rates of 
students. That most law schools have been able to do 
precisely that over the long run indicates that a high bar-
exam passage standard can be met.”150 
Yet for lower-ranked schools, especially in California, 
there is no evidence that any law school has been able to 
consistently perform better on the bar exam than would have 
been predicted by their entering class credentials.151 All the 
schools have many more personnel dedicated to academic 
support than in the past, but the success of those programs 
over time is unclear. One reason for the lack of comparative 
success is that they are competing with each other in an arms 
race, but even so, if the programs were demonstrably 
effective, the Bar Examiners might then acknowledge that 
the pool of exams is better as a whole, which they have not 
done. The only way low-ranked access-oriented law schools 
can consistently improve bar passage is through attrition of 
low performing students, but the putative twenty percent 
cap also limits that strategy, which is tough on students in 
any event.152 In addition, attrition among the high 
performing students, who transfer to higher ranked law 
schools, also lowers the bar passage rate, since they are 
counted as part of the school to which they transfer.153 
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The choice of the cut score on an exam, which, it is clear, 
does not test what makes a good lawyer, is taken as a given 
in most of this debate. There is the hope that a national bar 
examination might lessen the differential and at least allow 
people to use a score to move to another state where the score 
will pass. The critical problem now is that low ranked law 
schools and the urban schools that I have emphasized here 
face the challenge that, in today’s world, they are admitting 
students with lower LSAT scores than in the past. We do not 
know if these individuals who make it through law school are 
doomed to be bad lawyers or should be denied admission. We 
know only that they will have a harder time on the bar 
exams, especially those with high cut rates. We also know 
that those attending the urban law schools today as in the 
past are more likely to be relatively poor, to speak English as 
a second language, and to be the first in a family to attend 
law school.154 
The question under today’s conditions is whether the 
accreditation standards should make it impossible for many 
of these upwardly mobile students to attend law schools, 
such as the urban ones, that tend to lead to good, if not highly 
lucrative, careers.155 One argument for denying them is that 
not enough of these students have law jobs ten months after 
graduation, 156 but that is a very poor indicator of the value 
of a law degree.157 The second argument is that their debt is 
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too high, but again this is not an issue unique to law schools, 
and the general data suggest that the debt issue is 
overblown.158 The cost is a major issue, but again there is a 
question of whether those seeking upward mobility should be 
stopped and denied access according to the proposition that 
law is “not for them.” 
The preceding paragraphs do not pretend to resolve the 
debates about debt, the appropriate standards for admission 
to law school, and the vicissitudes of early careers for law 
school graduates. The point is that the current debate and 
recipes for reform are extremely one-sided, as in the 1930s. 
Those in the relatively higher status law schools have shaped 
the debate and the media reporting while ignoring or 
downplaying uncertainties and counter arguments. Every 
issue is resolved against the lower-ranked schools. 
As in the 1930s, it appears that the prosperity of urban 
law schools committed to upward mobility is threatened. The 
threat comes especially from the relatively more elite law 
schools and their allies, who are themselves under a 
somewhat different threat. The elite law schools are 
challenged by a relative decline in what they see as the “best 
and brightest,” meaning those with the resources and 
background to bring elite credentials to their law school 
applications. That group, according to my argument here, is 
indeed essential to maintaining the important position of law 
in the United States. My argument is also that the urban law 
schools and, in general, the law schools that provide access 
to the disadvantaged are equally part of what is essential to 
keep generating new demands and new positions for law and 
lawyers. 
Many within the elite circles of legal education are not 
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unscrupulous for taking on students with low application 
credentials. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, I believe the 
success of the urban law schools is vital to the success of the 
legal profession in the United States. Clearly the schools 
have played a major and complementary role to the more 
elite schools in the past. The argument today can be 
summarized as follows. 
The first point is that without the urban law schools 
many relatively disadvantaged students, immigrants, and 
children of immigrants, simply will not go to law school and 
become lawyers. The urban schools are the major points of 
entry for this group of students, and their application 
credentials will be far from those of the elite schools. The 
credentials have fallen recently, but there is no reason to see 
that decline as inevitable. 
Second, despite the attitude of many of the more elite 
legal educators, the legitimacy of the legal profession can be 
challenged if the claim for equal justice depends on elite 
corporate law on one side and elite public interest law on the 
other. The examples of Britain and France in the Depression 
suggest that during times of social ferment, a legal profession 
too identified with the elite establishment may lose influence 
and stature. Many of the lawyers that brought law to leftist 
movements in the 1960s, and to the right in the 1980s, came 
from lower-ranked law schools in touch with grassroots 
political movements.159 Only later did the elite capitalize on 
and gain a strong position within these movements. 
Third, a similar point is that the relative openness of the 
U.S. legal profession fosters innovation that redounds to the 
success of the profession as a whole—new demand creation. 
Examples from the past include litigation as a business 
strategy, corporate bankruptcy, corporate immigration, and 
the development of plaintiffs’ personal injury and class 
 
 159. See generally SOUTHWORTH, supra note 84; Teles, supra note 84, at 3; 
Hilbink, supra note 46, at 265–67. 
GARTH 65.2  
2017]  CORPORATE FIRMS AND URBAN SCHOOLS 327 
action practice. Most of these start outside the corporate law 
context and then become mainstays of corporate law firm 
growth. These examples also move individuals with 
expertise—who often graduated from non-elite schools—in 
those practices into strong positions within corporate law 
firms. 
More recently, borrowing from the qualitative interviews 
of the After the JD Project, we see careers made up out of 
linguistic, ethnic, and national origins experiences.160 The 
impact of these examples is notable. One interviewee went to 
a relatively low-ranked law school, practiced intellectual 
property for a while, and then built a practice serving 
engineers from his Islamic community. He was very 
successful and accordingly, mosques began to ask him how 
to handle threatening requests from governmental entities. 
His work in all aspects brought Muslim Americans in touch 
with the law and the law in touch with their issues. The 
access issue in this respect is also a social control issue, 
which brings disputes and conflicts into the law.161 
CONCLUSION: COMPLEMENTARY BROKERS AND THE FUTURE 
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
The strong position of law in the United States puts 
lawyers in a position to participate in economic, social, and 
cultural movements and changes. My argument in this 
article is that this strong position depends on the success of 
corporate law firms, as the embodiment of the elite, and 
urban law schools, as the embodiment of the upward mobility 
project. The two sides are related. They fight as part of the 
legal field. Relatively elite law schools use the urban, as well 
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as other lower-ranked law schools, in order to enhance their 
relative prestige and promote “reforms,” which make 
existence of the urban law schools more precarious. Many 
graduates of the urban law schools, especially those who 
dominate the plaintiffs’ bar, thrive by challenging corporate 
law firms through mass torts and class actions. 
Each side serves as a kind of broker connecting law to 
social movements, economic power, politics, and people. The 
combination also promotes an entrepreneurialism in the 
interests of the legal profession and both institutions. The 
success to date of the legal profession in the United States 
has depended on the success of both sides. If demand is going 
to be maintained or augmented in the future, it will come 
from this entrepreneurial and broker relationship. 
Challenges to either institution are challenges to the position 
of the legal profession. 
 
